Chapter 8:   SUBSIDIARY BODIES

Section 7:   Appointment of bureaux of subsidiary bodies

 

For first time in four years, Security Council publishes 2024 subsidiary body bureaux on year’s first working day

 

China becomes fourth permanent member to take on vice chair positions

 

In a Note by the President dated 2 January 2024 (S/2024/2), the Security Council announced the chairs and vice chairs of its subsidiary organs for the year 2024. These appointments were arrived at through a selection process set out in presidential notes S/2017/507 and S/2019/991. In accordance with paragraph 113 of the former, consultations on the appointments are to be “facilitated jointly by two members of the Security Council”. One co-facilitator is to be a permanent member (understood to be the P5 rotating coordinator for the relevant months[1]). As explained by the representative of Japan in a 2016 press conference, the other co-facilitator is to be the elected member serving as Chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions (IWG). Thus for the 2024 selection process, the elected member co-facilitator was Albania.

 

S/2017/507, paragraph 111 states that Council members “should make every effort to agree provisionally on the appointment of the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies for the following year no later than 1 October.” While not agreed precisely by that date, the 2024 appointments were finalized in ample time for the presidential note announcing them to be published on the first working day of the new year, as is the intended practice.

 

This timeliness was not possible the three prior years. In 2023, the presidential note announcing the bureaux was delayed by 17 working days. In 2022, the presidential note was seven working days late. And it was three working days late in 2021.[2]

 

In recent years, the E10 co-facilitator and the five incoming members (I5) have made a concerted effort to reach agreement on a complete “package” proposing the chairs for all open positions. Some past delays have occurred when any P5 have objected to one or more of the proposed apportionments. In other instances, disagreements have arisen among the I5 themselves when some are competing for the same assignments, or when no incoming member wants to chair a certain body.

 

For 2024, the incoming members will be chairing the following subsidiary organs (the names in parentheses indicate the former 2023 Chair):[3]

 

Algeria: 

• Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) (“Counter-Terrorism Committee”) (United Arab Emirates)

• Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic (Ghana)

• Working Group established pursuant to resolution 1566 (2004)[4] (United Arab Emirates) 

 

Guyana:

• Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau (United Arab Emirates)

• Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) concerning Haiti (Gabon)

 

Republic of Korea: 

• Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan (Ghana)

• Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014)[5] (Albania)

• Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations (Ghana)

 

Sierra Leone: 

• Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Gabon)

• Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan (Gabon)

• Informal Working Group on International Tribunals (Gabon)

• Co-Chair with Switzerland of the Informal Expert Group on Women and Peace and Security[6] (United Arab Emirates)

 

Slovenia: 

• Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003)[7] (Albania)

• Committee established pursuant to resolution 1636 (2005)[8] (Albania)

 

 

For the elected members remaining on the Council for the second year of their terms, their chairing responsibilities for 2024 will remain those decided in 2023, as detailed in another article on this website. Japan additionally is taking on leadership of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions, of which it was Vice Chair in 2023. The prior chair was Albania.

​

There has been a general consensus among Council members that it is preferable for each elected member to chair the same subsidiary body for two successive years. However, there have been ample cases of a member chairing a subsidiary body for a single year. In 2003, the presidential note setting out the bureaux for the year stated that Spain would chair the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) beginning in April 2003. Spain served in that capacity into May 2004, when a presidential note announced that the position would pass to Russia.[9]

 

Moreover, in some recent years, the presidential note issued in January has indicated agreement that an elected member remaining on the Council for the following year would at that time move into a chair vacated by an outgoing member. A footnote in the 2021 presidential note stated that India would chair the Counter-Terrorism Committee until the end of 2022, after Tunisia left the chair. A similar footnote in S/2022/2 stated that the United Arab Emirates would chair the CTC until the end of 2023, after India left the chair. It was proposed that a similar footnote be included in the 2023 presidential note indicating that Japan would assume the IWG chair following the departure of Albania, but agreement was lacking among all P5 to do so. As an alternative, the E10 coordinator for January 2023 (Ecuador) sent a letter to the Council President stating that all ten elected members “underline that they unanimously support Japan as Chair of the Informal Working Group in 2024.”[10]

 

Considerations of fairness in apportioning chairs and vice chairs

 

For many elected members, chairing a key subsidiary body can be one of the high points of their term, and the means by which they make some of their most significant contributions to the Council’s work. In particular, serving as chair can sometimes give an elected member a leadership role when the matter for which their subsidiary body is responsible comes up for consideration in the Council itself. This latter function is one which some elected members are committed to enlarging, especially to include a more formal “penholder” role in the drafting of relevant Security Council outcome documents (see related article on this website concerning the 2023 presidential note relating to penholding).

 

At the same time, chairpersonships can be very demanding assignments for elected members, requiring a significant commitment of time and personnel, and sometimes placing them at the centre of controversies. Consequently, elected members have called for a wider division of labour whereby the permanent members would also assume some chairpersonships. This issue has been under lively discussion in the IWG and was one impetus towards adoption of the 2019 presidential note referenced above (S/2019/991), paragraph (b) of which states:

 

“The members of the Security Council stress that this informal consultation process [for designating Chairs] should take into account the need for a shared responsibility and a fair distribution of work for the selection of the Chairs among all members of the Council, bearing in mind the capacities and resources of members.” (our emphasis)

 

Previously, this question was also addressed in a 2018 letter signed by that year’s elected Council members and the 2019 incoming members (S/2018/1024). The letter emphasized “the need for fair burden-sharing and an equal distribution of work among all members of the Security Council, including its permanent members.” It added that “This principle should apply to the distribution of the chairmanships of the subsidiary bodies of the Council”.

 

The book (pages 556-57) notes that the general trend for elected members to chair subsidiary bodies began in the Council’s first decades. The book adds that

 

“The rationale for this practice has been obscured, but it may relate to an understanding reached in 1946 among the wider UN membership that the permanent members [of the Security Council] would have virtually continuous membership in some of the other United Nations principal organs or their governing bodies. As part of that understanding, it was reportedly agreed that the permanent members would not serve on the bureaux of those organs or governing bodies, so as to give the opportunity to other Member States to serve in leadership positions. It is possible that, in parallel, the same principle was applied to the bureaux of subsidiary organs of the Security Council.”

 

There have, nonetheless, been a few instances when permanent members have chaired Council subsidiary organs. The Committee of Inquiry established by resolution 496 (1981) in connection with Seychelles was chaired by France. The United Kingdom was the first Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Russian Federation served as its third Chair. In addition, France was the first Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict.

 

The role of vice chair varies considerably from one subsidiary body to another. In many cases, vice chairs mainly provide geographic balance for the bureaux. In other cases, chairs consult closely with their vice chairs on the work of the body, and particularly concerning important decisions. And in still other cases, the vice chairs of bodies such as the Counter-Terrorism Committee or the 1540 Committee have distinct, ongoing responsibilities. 

 

For 2024, the majority of vice chairs will again be elected members. However, three of the permanent members – France,[11] the Russian Federation[12] and the United Kingdom[13] – will continue to serve as vice chairs of several subsidiary bodies. And for the first time ever, China will also serve as a vice chair. China will do so for the sanctions committee concerning Haiti chaired by Guyana, as well as for the sanctions committee on Al-Shabaab chaired by Japan. Together with the United Kingdom, China will also serve as a vice chair for the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations chaired by the Republic of Korea. The United States, as has been its consistent practice, will hold no vice chair positions in 2024.[14]  

 

The elected member signatories of the 2018 letter also advocated that “as a general rule, no member should chair more than two subsidiary bodies”. As it happens, for 2024, three incoming elected members – Algeria, the Republic of Korea and Sierra Leone – will each hold three of the chairpersonships announced in the presidential note. Additionally, Sierra Leone will serve as Co-Chair, together with Switzerland, of an additional subsidiary body not announced in the note, the Informal Expert Group on Women and Peace and Security.[6] Continuing members Japan and Malta will each also lead three subsidiary bodies in 2024.

  

It should be noted that the number of subsidiary bodies chaired by an individual Council member is not the only indicator of a heavy workload. A member leading fewer subsidiary organs may still have burdensome responsibilities if chairing a body that is intensely active.[15]

 

Concluding thoughts

 

Overall, there appears to be a growing acceptance among Council members – elected and permanent – that it is to the advantage of the Council as a whole that the appointment process be conducted as flexibly and fairly possible. This is seen in the fact that since 2015, the Council has progressively improved the mechanism through which its subsidiary organ bureaux are appointed. Moreover, there is now a high degree of coordination among the incoming five members (I5). In recent years, the I5 have frequently been able to decide upon a complete slate, even when this has not completely aligned with their Security Council priorities.

 

Nonetheless, difficulties in finalizing the selection of chairs will on occasion probably still arise, especially during years when very desirable, or very undesirable, positions are to be filled. Accordingly, it remains to be seen whether the timely 2004 appointment process is an indication that the Council is back on track for the future, or whether this year will prove to have been an exception.

 

This chart indicates the timeliness of publishing the bureaux for each year since 2000.    

 

(This update supplements pages 556 to 559 of the book.)

____________________________________

[1] Following the June 2023 election of new members, the P5 coordinator was first China (through July), followed by the United States (August to October), and then the Russian Federation (through January 2024).

[2] In response to the delays of recent years, in 2023 the Security Council adopted on a presidential note which establishes a contingency measure in the event appointing the subsidiary bodies bureaux is delayed (see article on this website).

[3] In instances where an official name is not indicative of the matter being addressed by a subsidiary body, a footnote provides that information.

[4] Tasked by the resolution with examining “practical measures to be imposed upon individuals, groups or entities involved in or associated with terrorist activities, other than those designated by the Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee” (now two separate committees), and “the possibility of establishing an international fund to compensate victims of terrorist acts and their families”.

[5] Relating to Yemen.

[6] The Informal Expert Group is not formally recognized as a Council subsidiary organ owing to the nuanced language of resolution 2242 (2015) by which it was created, and its co-chairs are therefore not designated in presidential note S/2024/2. However, incoming members take the co-chairing of the IEG into consideration when they are measuring what kind of overall workload they think they can handle. And because the IEG is well-regarded, the option of serving as a co-chair can sometimes lead an I5 to give up a bid for a different chair that they also wanted. For more information about the IEG's status, see related article on this website.

[7] Relating to individuals and entities subject to the assets freeze imposed by resolution 1483 (2003) in connection with Iraq.

[8] Relating to suspects in the killing of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.

[9] S/2003/30; S/2004/436.

[10] S/2023/68.

[11] Counter-Terrorism Committee; Working Group established pursuant to resolution 1566 (2004). 

[12] Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities; Counter-Terrorism Committee; Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011); Working Group established pursuant to resolution 1566 (2004).

[13] Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004); Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations.

[14] The first time a permanent member served as a vice chair was in 2001, when the Russian Federation was named as one of the three vice chairs for the newly established Counter-Terrorism Committee. The United Kingdom became the next P5 to do so when it took up a vice chair position with the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 upon that committee’s creation in 2004. And France began serving as a vice chair of the CTC in 2009 after its ongoing chairing of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict passed to Mexico.

[15] In some cases, chairs have rotated among the various regional groups to which Council members belong. A noteworthy example is the Counter-Terrorism Committee, which has been chaired by members from all five UN regional groups. In other cases, chairpersonships have had continuity within a regional group. For example, since 2007, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) relating to the DPRK nuclear weapons programme has been successively chaired by members of the Western European and Other States Group. In yet other cases, chairing responsibility has stayed within one regional group for an extended period of time and then rotated. For example, from 2012 to 2019, chairing of the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals was by a member of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States. Then for 2020-21, Viet Nam (from the Asia-Pacific Group) stepped into that role, after which Gabon and now Sierra Leone (both of the Africa Group) have successively chaired this working group since 2022.